FCSH

One leading interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty proposes the view that some certainties
are universal and immutable. This paper argues against this assumption and claims
that the concept of objective certainty does not refer to something that is shown, but that it
indicates the origin of primitive language-games. The focus therefore is a grammatical one.
Primitive language-games in which we are socialized with certainty and which are the condition
for more elaborate language-games like knowing or doubting, should be conceived as
mutable, since their grammar is arbitrary and unjustified. As a result of the mutability, it can
be concluded that in On Certainty Wittgenstein discovers a reciprocal and dynamic relation
between the fore- and the background of our convictions. This dynamic relation is appropriately
expressed in the riverbed metaphor and excludes the idea of foundationalism as sourced
in universal certainties.

There has been a lengthy discussion about Wittgenstein’s insights into what it is to follow a rule. In contrast, very little has been said about how Wittgenstein might have conceived of the fact that from time to time we make up new rules which are then integrated into existing social practices. In this paper I will argue first that the difference between established rules and new rules consists in the fact that established rules may be described with reference to the existing social practices, whereas new rules are prescriptive and have to be conceived of as the result of a demand for their future integration into the system of established rules. In the second part, I shall formulate two necessary conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to integrate prescriptive rules into the established system of rules. I will summarize both conditions under the term ›Practicability Approach‹.

Der Gebrauchscharakter der Sprache, der mit Wittgensteins Sichtweise auf das Wesen der Sprache verbunden ist, ruft Fragen hinsichtlich des Zwecks und des Gegenstands des Gebrauchs hervor. Wittgenstein legt sich diesbezüglich in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen und darüber hinaus nicht eindeutig fest. Ich möchte deshalb untersuchen, was darunter zu verstehen ist, dass (I) mit einzelnen sprachlichen Einheiten und (II) mit einer Sprache insgesamt ein Zweck verbunden ist. Daraus wird sich der Schluss ziehen lassen, dass mit dem Bezug auf unterschiedliche Gegenstände des Gebrauchs auch unterschiedliche Zweckbegriffe in Anschlag gebracht werden, die in der Wittgenstein-Rezeption indes häufig miteinander verwechselt werden.

The word ›persuasion‹ usually can have two different meanings. Either it means a process of changing someone’s belief or action without any argumentative justification or, on the contrary, it means that the changings indeed are a result of argumentative discourse. Those two different meanings are part of a conceptual development during the history of philosophy. Nowadays they are often put in contrast to each other, whereas persuasion in philosophy as a non-argumentative act is taken as doubtful and even unsound. In the following paper, I argue that both types of processes shall not be conceived of as counterparts, taking some notes from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as an argumentative source. I will show that persuading as a rational practice bases on the possibility of persuasion as a process of inculcation. Those processes can help us to enlighten the notions of good grounds, reasons and persuasion. In contrast to the common perspective, I show that they are even the normal case regarding the interaction between humans, and thus they fundamentally provide the possibility of an argumentative practice of giving and taking reasons. As a conclusion, the primacy of argumentative persuasion in relation to inculcation needs to be reversed and the common understanding of human beings as genuine rational acting being needs to be questioned.

The word ‘persuasion’ can be used in two different ways. It can either implicate a process of changing someone’s belief or action without any argumentative justification or, to the contrary, indicate that the changes are indeed a result of argumentative discourse. These two different uses are part of a conceptual development in the history of philosophy. Nowadays they are often placed in contrast to each other, whereby persuasion in philosophy as a non-argumentative act is taken as doubtful and even unsound. In the paper I argue that the two types of processes should not be conceived of as incompatible, taking some notes from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as an argumentative source. I show that persuading as a rational practice is based on the possibility of persuasion as a process of inculcation. These processes can help illuminate the notions of good grounds, reasons and persuasion. In contrast to the common perspective, I show that they are actually the normal case regarding interaction between humans and thus fundamentally provide the possibility of an argumentative practice of giving and accepting reasons. I conclude that the primacy of argumentative persuasion in relation to inculcation needs to be reversed and the common understanding of human beings as genuine rational acting beings needs to be questioned.

Famously, Wittgenstein claims in the Philosophical Investigations that for a large number of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” it can be explained in the following way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. The picture of language which is indicated by this claim raises questions regarding an adequate understanding of the character of use. In my paper I investigate how exactly the character of use can be conceived of regarding (I) the purposes of different linguistic entities, and (II) the purpose of language as a whole. I will come to the conclusion that in referring to different objects of use the concept of purpose has to be considered differently as well which, however, have often been confused in recent debates.

In this paper I will reject bootstrap rationality by showing its incoherence. Secondly, I will give an explanation for the incoherence showing why sufficient reasons for achieving ends do not derive from the normative principle of instrumental rationality. Proponents of bootstrap rationality confuse the normative sources of having sufficient reasons for achieving ends. I shall argue instead, thirdly, that sufficient reasons for achieving ends independently derive from the normative requirement of practicability and instrumental reasons are only sufficient insofar as they fulfill this requirement.

When philosophers talk about the psychology of human beings they usually refer to their mental states, e.g. to what they believe, desire, fear, hope, etc. In this paper I am interested in what it means that someone believes something. Human beings believe many things, and what they believe, i.e. their beliefs, develop in different ways. They acquire beliefs, they justify their beliefs, they change their beliefs, and sometimes they give up their beliefs. In considering the question of what it means for someone to have a belief, I take into account the development of someone’s beliefs. I also use some of Wittgenstein’s re-marks from On Certainty that consider how and under which circumstances we use our language in order to express that someone believes something.

Human beings are using practical reasons in order to understand their actions. Philosophers are fascinated by the nature of practical reasons. To what kind of object are we referring when we explain action? Are practical reasons the agent's psychological states like beliefs or desires? Are they facts in the world and thus independent from the agent's mind? Are reasons the causes of our actions?

This book offers a new perspective on these matters contributing to a complex debate in modern action theory. Following ideas of the Later Wittgenstein it offers the view that practical reasons are not to be conceived of as ontological objects, but rather as instruments in language that are related to functions and purposes. In doing so, the author presents a fresh view on the normative conditions for using reasons, their role in the process of practical reasoning, and their meaning for motivation and moral action in a common shared practice.

One of the questions that Wittgenstein was concerned with during his lifetime is the question of how to understand the idea of intentionality. How can we understand the fact that inanimate things in the outer world become animated in our consciousness while finding ourselves in mental states that refer to them? Wittgenstein calls this the " old problem of the harmony between thought and reality ". In the first part of this paper I briefly present his way of dissolving the problem arguing that the relation between the content of mental states and reality is not representational. In the second part of the paper I explore whether this argument also applies with respect to perceptual experience. It is often assumed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e. that it has representational content. I show that Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality is not quite suitable for either approving or rejecting this assumption. However, I shall give a further argument claiming that at least in some cases the content of perceptual experience is indeed not representational. As a conclusion I present the view that perceptual experience should be understood as the ability to arrange sensations, rather than as mental states that have representational content.

The idea that the function of language is its use is commonly ascribed to the Later Wittgenstein. In this paper, I argue that there is textual evidence already coming from the early manuscripts (Ms) proving that Wittgenstein's philosophical development is culminating in the idea of function as use around 1929–30. I interpret a passage from Ms-107 in order to show that Wittgenstein's practical turn has sources in different stages of his philosophical development, each of which is dominated by different ideas: the idea of a picture theory; the idea of a phenomenological language and the idea of function as use.

Developmental psychologists have argued for the view that understanding one’s own intentions and the intentions of others consists in the performance of a psychological mechanism and moreover that the ability to understand intentions depends on the ontogenetic development of this mechanism. In this paper, I refer to Michael Tomasello as the most notable proponent of this view and present arguments against it. I argue that understanding intentions results from social agreement in practice rather than from psychological processes transpiring in the minds of intentional agents. In my defence, I will appeal to the later Wittgenstein, who expounds the view I proffer here. First, I shall expose the key differences in each of their views, particularly in terms of how the ability to understand intentions is related to language acquisition. In the second section, I employ an argument from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations to reject the claim that children in their first year of life develop an understanding of intentions ontogenetically. Finally, in the third section I argue that the understanding of an intention requires the ability to form an intention autonomously. In the process of forming an intention, the child creates its own understanding, namely one that is socially accepted if it is in agreement with established usage, customs, and institutions as part of everyday practice. On the basis of this view, I suggest that understanding intentions depends on the agreement of behaviour in certain practical contexts rather than as the accordance of mental states with a psychological mechanism.